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I.

INTRODUCTION

In ancient Greece, story tellers often told of the Minotaur, a halfbull, half-human monster born to the wife of King Minos of Crete.
King Minos caged his monster in a labyrinth, a prison of endlessly
twisting trails from which escape was almost impossible. To avenge
a wrong committed by the King of Athens, King Minos sacrificed
fourteen Athenian youths to the Minotaur every nine years. During
one of these periodic sacrifices, Ariadne, King Minos's daughter, fell
in love with one of the Athenian victims - Theseus, son of the King
of Athens who had come to kill the Minotaur. Ariadne told Theseus
to fasten a spool of thread at the entrance of the labyrinth and
unwind it as he proceeded so he could retrace his steps. Theseus
killed the Minotaur and, with the aid of Ariadne's strategem, escaped.
Implementing court unification is like trying to escape from King
Minos's labyrinth without the aid of Ariadne's string. The bewildered prisoner will encounter junction after junction where he must
either turn or go straight. Most decisions will lead him down a
circuitous route to a dead end, forcing him to retrace his steps to
find where he went wrong. Even as he retraces his steps he may err
again, once more stumbling into an impasse. Only rarely will good
fortune and persistence suffice to lead him to an exit.
This article examines the plight of decision-makers as they at* This article is part of a larger study prepared under Grant Number 76-NI-99-0124 from
the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions expressed in this document are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
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**** B.A. University of Wisconsin; currently enrolled DePaul University College of Law;
Research Assistant, Educational Programs, American Judicature Society, Chicago, Illinois.
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tempt to implement five elements of court unification. It suggests
that even without the aid of Ariadne's string, escape from the labyrinth may be possible. What is required, instead, is a map of the
maze.
The literature on implementation does not provide the needed
map. Some studies postulate theories of implementation with little
or no reference to specific situations.' Some detail the perplexing
minutiae required to implement specific programs or policies in
specific places with little regard to theory or to problems encountered elsewhere.' Most of the literature discusses the implementation of executive and legislative reform of federal and state programs, but ignores judicial reforms such as state court unification.
That which has been written about implementing court unification
neither analyzes nor compares the experiences of different states.
This article attempts to fill that gap. It outlines some of the problems which can be expected in implementing court unification and
recommends some solutions to solve these problems. To accomplish
these objectives the authors reviewed the literature on court unification and visited eleven carefully selected states to conduct in-depth
interviews.'
Multiple courts and excessive local autonomy have plagued state
judiciaries throughout their histories. So many different trial courts
existed that at times states lost track of their number, types and
locations. Cases were often aborted on jurisdictional technicalities;
procedures varied from court to court; and political considerations
sometimes affected the decisions of local judges.
1. See Bunker, Policy Sciences Perspectives on Implementation Processes, 3 POL'Y SCi.
71 (1972); Gardner, Implementation: The Process of Change, in COURT STUDY PROCESS 167
(Solomon ed. 1975); Sorg, A Typology of Individual Behaviors in IMPLEMENTATION SITUATIONS
(March 30 - April 2, 1977) (unpublished paper presented at the 30th National Conference on
Public Administration of the American Society for Public Administration); Smith, The
Policy Implementation Process, 4 POL'Y SCI. 197 (1973); Van Meter & Van Horn, The Policy
Implementation Process:A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADM. AND Soc'Y 445 (1975).
2. See GROSS, GIAQUINTA & BERNSTEIN, IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS: A SoCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PLANNED EDUCATIONAL CHANGE (1971); PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY,
IMPLEMENTATION (1973).

3. The eleven states included Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, New York, Ohio, South Dakota and Washington. They were carefully selected to
represent states in various stages of unification. Interviews were conducted with over 100
supreme court justices, lower court judges, court administrators, legislators, court clerks and
knowledgeable citizens. One interviewer spent four days in each state between January and
April, 1977. Generally the interviews were conducted at the respondents' place of business
and lasted one hour. Since all interviewees were promised anonymity, this article sometimes
includes quotations without citation or attribution.
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Many problems resulted from state legislatures' refusing to fund
the courts adequately. Legislatures often required local courts to be
self supporting and sometimes even required courts to fund other
public expenditures. For example, courts used fines, costs and fees
collected from local litigation to pay their operating expenses, and
local speed traps often paid for road construction. As a result, the
cost of litigation and the price of punishment differed across a state.
Even worse, some courts became rich while others remained poor.
In the early years of this century, Dean Roscoe Pound attacked
the inadequacies of the American judicial system and suggested a
number of reforms based on the English Judicature Act of 1873.1
The English Act had consolidated five appellate courts and eight
trial courts into a two-tier system with one court of final appeal and
one court of first instance. "This idea of unification," said Pound,
"has proved most effective. Indeed, its advantages are self-evident."
Pound advised that the plan "deserved the careful study of American lawyers as a model modem judicial organization." 5
Since Pound's 1906 address, an increasing number of authorities
have recommended that states unify their courts, and several states
have done so. Despite the trend toward court unification, scholars
continue to argue over what the concept comprises. This argument
has even reached the point of states proudly claiming they have
unified their courts and scholars hotly denying their claims., We
cannot entirely avoid the problem caused by scholarly disagreement
over the definition, because to understand the problems of implementation it is first necessary to know what court unification is. For
the purposes of this article a unified court system comprises the
following five elements: (1) consolidated and simplified court structure; (2) centralized administration; (3) centralized rule-making;
(4) centralized budgeting; and (5) state financing.'
4. The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, address by
Roscoe Pound, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, St. Paul, Minnesota (August 29, 1906) reprinted in 20 J. AM. Jun. Soc'v 178 (1937).
5. Id. at 184.
6. See, e.g., Ashman & Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1, 19-21 (1974); Berkson, Court Unification for Tennessee?, 13 TENN. B.J. 39 (1977).
7. See Berkson, The Emerging Ideal of Court Unification, 60 JUDIcATuRE 372 (1977).
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THE ELEMENTS OF COURT UNIFICATION

Consolidated and Simplified Court Structure

Simplifying the court structure is central to the concept of unification. Although most authorities agree that the number of courts
should be reduced, they disagree on the optimum number that
should be retained.' The proposals advanced advocate one or two
appellate courts and one or two trial courts - this leads to four
variations.
The simplest proposal calls for only two courts: a supreme court
and a trial court.' In practice, only the judiciaries of Idaho, Iowa and
South Dakota resemble this model.'"
A slightly more complex model proposes that state judiciaries
contain three separate courts: a supreme court; a trial court of general jurisdiction; and a trial court of limited jurisdiction.", This
8. Actually some authorities have changed their position about the number of trial courts
which should exist. Compare Pound, supra note 4 with Pound, Principlesand Outline of a
Modern Unified Court System, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 225 (1940); Winters, A.B.A. House of
Delegates Approves Model JudicialArticle for State Constitutions,45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 279
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Winters] with A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (Final Draft 1974) (hereinafter
cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS]; and Draft JudiciaryArticle, 3 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 135 (1920)
(prepared by the American Judicature Society for the National Municipal League) with
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 6.01, at 12 (1963). One organization, which clearly favors a single trial court, has not taken a position on an intermediate
appellate court. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 164-165 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON STANDARDS]. One organization has recommended that local conditions should
govern the precise form unification should take. See THE TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 33 (1967), [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE on Administration of Justice].
9. This model was proposed by Roscoe Pound in his 1906 address to the American Bar
Association. See Pound, supra note 4, at 184. It has also received some support among
reformers. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON STANDARDS, supra note 8 and The Case for
a Two-Level State Court System, 50 JUDICATURE 185 (1967).
10. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION (1973 & Supp. 1975 and 1977) [hereinafter cited as LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION].

11. One of the earliest statements of this proposal was a model judicial article drafted in
1902 by the American Judicature Society at the request of the National Municipal league.
See Draft JudiciaryArticle, supra note 8. Earlier versions of this article appeared in print in
October, 1914 and March, 1917. Allan Ashman and Jeffrey A. Parness have observed that
the Society's position was influenced by an A.B.A. committee report which discussed unification and was cited in 34 A.B.A. Rep. 578, 589-95 (1909). As Ashman and Parness state, "The
Society recognized the 1909 A.B.A. report as the work where 'the conception of the unified
state court system first received adequate expression."' The State-Wide JudicatureAct, 1 J.
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model exists in only Hawaii, Rhode Island and Virginia. 2
The third model varies from the second in the type, but not in the
number of courts. This model envisions a supreme court, an intermediate appellate court and a single trial court. 3 Only Illinois con4
forms to this model.
The final model of court organization proposes four different
courts: a supreme court; an intermediate appellate court; a general
jurisdiction trial court; and a limited jurisdiction trial court. 5 In
AM. JuD. Soc'Y 101 (1917) quoted in Ashman & Parness, supra note 6, at 5 n.9. This model
has received the support of numerous scholars, including Roscoe Pound in his 1940 Principles
and Outline of a Modem Unified Court System. See Pound, supra note 8. See also Model
JudiciaryArticle and Comment Thereon, 26 J.AM. JUD. Soc'Y 51 (1942). Although the ParkerVanderbilt Standards of 1938 only implied that states should adopt a unified judicial system
and did not discuss court structure explicitly, the A.B.A. committee which adopted the
standards implicitly approved of the two-tier trial court. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 263 (1949) [hereinafter cited as VANDERBILT]. See also Standards
of JudicialAdministration Adopted, 22 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 66 (1938).
12. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 10. A number of states do
not fit this model because they have intermediate appellate courts. These include Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. Id. Others do not
correspond with this model because they have more than two trial courts. These include:
Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. Id.
13. Several authorities also support this model. See Winters, supra note 8 (discussing the
A.B.A. Model Judicial Article of 1962); A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 8; National Conference
on the Judiciary, Consensus Statement of the National Conference on the Judiciary, in
JUSTICE IN THE STATES

265-66 (1971). Although reformers in the early part of the twentieth

century did not consider intermediate appellate courts essential to a unified system, support
for them has grown as states have become increasingly burdened by heavy caseloads. Indeed,
the two most recent models supported by the American Bar Association both favor an intermediate appellate court but differ in the number of trial courts they support. Compare
Winters, supra note 8 with A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 8. The growing need for intermediate appellate courts has been firmly endorsed by the National Conference on the Judiciary.
"If the appellate caseload is too great for a single court to adequately perform its tasks of
correcting errors, developing law and supervising the courts below, serious consideration
should be given to creating an intermediate appellate court." National Conference on the
Judiciary, supra note 13, at 266.

14.

LAw

ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,

supra note 10. Most states do not fit

this model because they have too many trial courts. Alabama, New York, Pennsylvania and
Texas do not conform because they have more than one intermediate appellate court. Id.
15. This model also has numerous proponents. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34 (1971);
Winters, supra note 8, at 280 (discussing the A.B.A. Model Judicial Article of 1962);
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A SURVEY OF UNIFIED COURT ORGANIZATIONS 6 (1974); NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 8.
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practice, this model exists only in Florida and North Carolina, but
the California and Maryland judiciaries resemble it closely., '
B.

CentralizedAdministration

The benefits offered by a consolidated court structure can best be
realized through centralized judicial administration. Like court consolidation, proponents of unification have suggested several different models for states to follow. All of the models suggest that the
judiciary should manage itself, 7 but they differ over which agency
of the courts should bear primary responsibility.
One model suggests that the chief justice and judicial council
share administrative authority." Another proposes that the chief
justice be solely responsible for judicial administration. 9 A third
model would vest administrative authority to implement policies in
the chief justice, but would vest the power to adopt administrative
policy in a judicial council.20 A fourth proposal gives the chief justice
ultimate administrative authority, but specifies that he should appoint an administrator and various assistants to aid him. 2'
16. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 10.
17. Generally, authorities agree that the judiciary, usually through the supreme court,
should control the following functions: assignment of judges; qualifications, hiring and firing
of auxiliary personnel; use of courthouse space; purchase of equipment; maintaining centralized records and gathering statistics; planning and research for the judicial system; continuing education for judges; and financial administration of the judiciary. See, e.g., VANDERBILT,
supra note 11, at 34-35.
18. This model was proposed by the American Judicature Society in the 1914 and 1917
drafts of the State-Wide Judicature Act. FirstDraft of a State-Wide JudicatureAct, Bulletin
VII of the Am. Jud. Soc'y 168 (October, 1914); Second Draft of a State-Wide JudicatureAct,
Bulletin VIII-A of the Am. Jud. Soc'y 75-82 (March, 1917). In 1920 the National Municipal
League endorsed a similar model. Editorial, 3 J. AM. JUD. Soc'¥ 131 (1920). See also Draft
JudiciaryArticle, supra note 8.
19. The first statement of this proposal appeared in the Parker-Vanderbilt Standards of
1938. Standardsof JudicialAdministration Adopted, supra note 11, at 67.

20.

A.B.A.

STANDARDS,

supra note 8, at 76-86.

21. This proposal may have originated with Roscoe Pound. In 1940 he suggested:
Supervision of the judicial-business administration of the whole court should be committed to the chief justice . . . . He should have authority to make reassignments or
temporary assignments of judges to particular branches or divisions or localities according to the amount of work to be done, and the judges at hand to to it. Disqualification, disability or illness of particular judges, or vacancies in office could be speedily
provided for in this way. He should have authority also . . . to assign or transfer cases
from one locality or court or division to another for hearing and disposition, as circumstances may require, so that judicial work may be equalized so far as may be [sicl
and clogging up of particular dockets and accumulation of arrears prevented at the
outset.
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Most states have adopted the latter model. Indeed, every state
but Mississippi employs a state court administrator." Generally,
the administrator is appointed by the chief justice or the supreme
court.23
C.

Centralized Rule-Making

A unified system allows the judiciary to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, procedure and administration for all courts in
the state. Models of this element of unification also vary. One model
vests rule-making authority in a judicial council.24 A second model
grants rule-making authority to a judicial council but allows the
legislature to "repeal, alter or supplement any rule of procedure by
a law limited to that specific purpose. ' 25 A third recommends that
the state's highest court have exclusive rule-making authority.26
This model, probably the most popular among authorities on unification, is followed in twenty one different states.2 7 According to a
fourth model, the supreme court should be allowed to promulgate
Pound, supra note 8, at 229. Pound also recognized that the chief justice might require
administrative assistance and proposed that, "competent business direction should be provided and put under the control and supervision of a responsible director. There very likely
may have to be a like officer in each branch and major division, or, if regional organization
becomes necessary, each region." Id. at 230. The American Bar Association, in its 1962 Model
Judicial Article, strongly'endorsed this proposal. See Winters, supra note 8, at 282.
22. See DOAN & SHAPIRO, STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS 17-117 (1976). Although the authors indicate that three states do not have administrators, both New Hampshire and Nevada
have hired one since the time the book was published.
23. In California, Georgia and Texas a judicial council appoints the administrator.
24. This model was proposed by the American Judicature Society in the 1914 and 1917
drafts of the State-Wide Judicature Act. See First Draft of a State-Wide JudicatureAct,
supra note 18 and Second Draft of a State-Wide JudicatureAct, supra note 18. In 1920 the
National Municipal League also endorsed this proposal. See Editorial, supra note 18 and
Draft Judiciary Article, supra note 8, at 139.
25. Model JudiciaryArticle and Comment Thereon, supra note 11, at 58. This model was
proposed in the National Municipal League's Model State Constitution of 1942.
26. In 1938 the ABA recommended that full "rule-making power be vested in the
courts." See VANDERBILT, supra note 11, at 506. Roscoe Pound argued in 1940 that rulemaking power should be "restored" to the judiciary. Pound, supra note 8. The ABA included
a proposal vesting'rule-making authority exclusively in the supreme court in its 1962 Model
Judicial Article. See Winters, supra note 8, at 282. For other proponents of this model see
TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 83; National Conference on the
Judiciary, supra note 13, at 265; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON STANDARDS, supra note
8; MINNESOTA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 18.
27. See PARNESS & KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES (1973), updated in BERKSON, CARBON & ROSENBAUM, COURT UNIFICATION: ITS
HISTORY, PoLrrICs AND IMPLEMENTATION (App. A 1978).
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rules, but the legislature may veto them.28 Eleven states conform to
this model."
D.

Centralized Budgeting

A single budget for the entire judiciary is a major goal of court
unification. Not only does a unitary budget require less time and
money to prepare, but it also helps states analyze their present
needs and plan for future programs and funds. Unlike the three
elements of unification already discussed, there is only one model
for this element. A centralized budget should be prepared by the
state court administrator. The legislature and the executive should
not help prepare the budget, and the governor should not have the
authority to veto it.30 Only twelve states approach this model.3 '
28. In 1963 the National Municipal League proposed that "The Supreme Court shall
make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall make and
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts."
But it added that the rules could be changed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature's entire

membership. See

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,

supra note 8, § 6.07 at 14. The Advisory

Commission on Intergovernmental Relations supported a proposal which allowed the legisla-

ture to veto court-made rules. See

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

supra note 15, at 34.
29. PARNESS & KORBAKES, supra note 27, updated in BERKSON, CARBON & ROSENBAUM,
supra note 27, at app. A.
30. In its 1962 Model Judicial Article, the American Bar Association first called for a
unitary judicial budget, prepared and submitted by a court administrator under the direction
of the chief justice. See Winters, supra note 8, at 282. In 1963 the National Municipal League
endorsed the concept. Section 6.06 of its Model State Constitution stated: "The chief justice
shall submit an annual consolidated budget for the entire unified judicial system." NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 8, § 6.06, at 14. In 1973 the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that "[a) budget for the operation of
the entire court system of the State should be prepared by the state court administrator and
submitted to the appropriate legislative body." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 176. The American Bar Association affirmed its support in 1974.

See A.B.A.

STANDARDS,

supra note 8, at 3, 98-104.

Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. See BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SuBSER31.

vIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

13 (1975). Baar not only identifies the states

that conform to the model, but he also derives three additional models to explain court
budgeting in the remaining states. In the least unified model, the court budget is prepared
by a source outside the judiciary, usually a state financial officer. Georgia, Texas, Utah, West
Virginia and Wisconsin are clearly in this category. Id. In other states, budgets are prepared
by each local court, subject to review by a central staff. They are then submitted to the
appropriate legislative or executive officials. Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan,
Ohio, and South Carolina are clearly in this category. Id. Finally, in some states, different
parts of the state court system prepare and submit separate requests to officials in the
legislative and executive branches. Alabama, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
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E.

State Financing

Like unitary budgeting, there is only one model for state financing: all judicial costs should be paid by the state.2 In practice, seven
states fund 80% or more of the judicial budget; three states fund 6080%; seven states fund 40-60%; twenty two states fund 20-44%; and
33
eleven states fund less than 20%.
III.

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES

Court unification, as the first section of this article observes, is a
five-point program for modernizing state judiciaries. A state can opt
for any one or all of these five elements by amending its constitution, and sometimes by passing a statute or promulgating a rule.
The amendment, statute or rule, standing alone, is but an empty
statement of policy; a state court system will not become unified
with respect to any of the five elements unless the policy is implemented.
Most people confront problems of implementation in their daily
lives without even recognizing them. They may decide to quit smoking or to lose weight,, for example, only to find out that it is easier
to establish the goal than to follow the regimen necessary to reach
it.Y Similarly administrators, judges, legislators and others confront
a number of problems when they attempt to implement court unifiNebraska and Washington are clearly in this category. Id. The rest of the states overlap
several categories. Id.
32. In 1929 and 1942 the National Municipal League advocated that the state pay the
salaries of court personnel. See Draft JudiciaryArticle, supra note 8, at 141; Model Judiciary
Article and Comment Thereon, supra note 11, at 59-60. In 1963 the League fully backed state
financing, saying, "the total cost of the (court] system shall be paid by the state." NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, § 6.06 supra note 8, at 14. See also TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 83; National Conference on the Judiciary, supra note 13; COMMrITEE

21 (1972); NATIONAL
supra note 8; A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 97;
Ashman & Parness, supra note 6, at 31; Gazell, Lower Court Unification in the American
States, 1974 ARIZ. L.J. 653, 660; Gallas, The Conventional Wisdom of State Court Administration: A CriticalAssessment and an Alternative Approach, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 35 (1976). But
see Hazard, McNamara & Sentilles, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J.
1286 (1972).
33. Baar, The Limited Trend Toward Court Financing and Unitary Budgeting in the
States, in MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 271 (Berkson, Hays & Carbon eds. 1977) updated in
Memorandum from Carl Baar to Larry Berkson and Susan Carbon (July 15, 1977). These data
are from the fiscal year ending 1974-1975 and may be slightly different now.
34. Williams, Special Issue on Implementation: Editor's Comments 1 POL'y ANALYSIS 452
(1975).
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

REDUCING CRIME AND ASSURING JUSTICE

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON STANDARDS,
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cation. First, they must pick their strategy: what method of implementation should they use; who should be responsible for executing
it; when should they begin; and how long should it take? Second,
they face the practical problems of putting their decisions into operation: how should the chosen method be structured to achieve the
intended result; what should be done if the effort miscarries; how
should accomplishments be institutionalized?
We have called the first step the systemic problem stage, because
it includes issues every state faces in deciding procedures and priorities. The second step focuses on the technical problems, the many
unexpected difficulties which arise when the plans are executed.
These categories are by no means discrete, but they do provide a
framework in which to analyze the problems of implementing court
unification. This section discusses the systemic problems; the next
section focuses on the technical difficulties.
A.

Definition
1.

The Methods

Our definition of implementation is composed of two distinct
parts: methods and process. Legislation, rules, and orders are the
three methods used to create a unified court system out of the rudimentary policy expressed in a state's constitution, statutes or
rules. 35 The most important of these is enabling legislation, which
specifies with precision the countless technicalities necessary to effect the policy. Court rules and administrative orders are equally
3
useful but less frequently used.
Court unification can be implemented most effectively through a
combination of these methods. Legislation, for example, is visible,
public and relatively permanent. Thus, statutes can establish the
number, names, types and jurisdiction of courts, as well as qualifications for office. But marshalling a bill through the legislature is a
35. In a broader sense, implementation has been defined as the means by which policies,
plans, decisions or programs are translated into effective collective action. See Bunker, supra
note 1, at 72.
36. It should be noted that a few reforms associated with court unification are selfimplementing. For example, neither a requirement that all judges devote full time to their
judicial duties, nor a provision that all judges be lawyers, needs additional legislation or
special rules to become operative. Self-implementing reforms are the exception rather than
the rule, however. Most of the elements of court unification cannot become fully effective
without implementing provisions.
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time consuming, cumbersome and often arduous task.
Court rules and administrative orders, on the other hand, are
usually more flexible and responsive to immediate needs. As a Florida Supreme Court justice observed, "the legislature simply cannot
anticipate all the problems and enact all the rules necessary." Rules
and administrative orders, therefore, can be used most effectively
to implement provisions which need frequent revision. Among those
areas conducive to implementation by rule or administrative order
are assignment of judges, designation of court boundaries and placement of auxiliary personnel.
2.

The Process

Implementation is more than methods; it is also the process which
transforms a policy into a realized goal. In other words, through
implementation, "unification" becomes the restructured court system. An implementer must decide which path to follow as often as
a prisoner in King Minos's labyrinth, and, like the prisoner, he may
choose the wrong path as often as he chooses the right one. Indeed,
successful implementation, like escape from the labyrinth, requires
planning and foresight as much as good fortune and persistence.
In their study of the unsuccessful implementation of a late 1960's
federal program to generate jobs for the chronic unemployed in
Oakland, California, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky
define implementation as the process of interaction between the
setting of goals and the actions geared to achieving them. But they
caution, implementation, by its very nature, is a dynamic process.
It should not be restricted by a static definition which focuses attention on only one aspect of that process. In fact, they stress:
Our working definition of implementation will do as a sketch
of the earliest stages of the program, but the passage of time
wreaks havoc with efforts to maintain tidy distinctions. As circumstances change, goals alter and initial conditions are subject to slippage. In the midst of action the distinction between
the initial conditions and the subsequent chain of causality
begins to erode. Once a program is underway implementers
become responsible both for the initial conditions and for the
objectives toward which they are supposed to lead. 7
37.

Preface

to PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY,

supra note 2, at xvii. Douglas R. Bunker describes
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Once a state decides to unify its courts, implementers must plan
a course of action to effect the policy. First, they must make certain
decisions and attempt to institute them. Some of these decisions
may take hold and succeed; others may fail completely; still others
may vacillate between success and failure. Decisions which are unsuccessful or partially successful must be remedied or improved
upon, while initial successes must be maintained and augmented.
Implementation, as a process, is composed of all of these decisions,
and the actions taken to carry them out, whether they succeed or
38
not.
B.

A Case Study

An example from Kentucky illustrates the dynamics of the implementation process. The new judicial article to the Kentucky Constitution, which was adopted in 1975, provides:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided into a
Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of
limited jurisdiction known as the District Court. The court
shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and
administration .39
This provision authorized the transformation of the existing court
structure, which then consisted of the court of appeals (the court of
last resort), the circuit court (the general jurisdiction trial court)
and a morass of limited jurisdiction trial courts with overlapping
jurisdiction. 0 The legislature decided that to implement this provision it should convert the court of appeals into a supreme court,
this process in slightly different terms. He suggests implementation is a set of "socio-political
processes flowing from and anticipated by early phases of the policy process." Bunker, supra
note 1, at 72. But, he states, "the process of moving toward realization of the policy content
requires more than the tactical and administrative planning that is usually included as part
of the policy proposal." Id. In fact, he notes, the necessary interplay between policy and
implementation is emphasized by Y. Dror's statement that, "repolicymaking is needed during the execution of the policy." DROR, PUBLIC POLICY MAKING REEXAMINED (1968), quoted in
Bunker, supra note 1.
38. A sense of this multi-dimensional quality in the implementation process is conveyed
through the model developed by Thomas B. Smith. See generally Smith, supra note 1.
39. Ky. CONST. § 109.
40. The principal limited jurisdiction trial courts abolished by the 1975 judicial article
were the county, justice, police and quarterly courts.
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create an intermediate appellate court, retain the circuit court, and
create a single district court by abolishing the many limited jurisdiction trial courts.
Although all of these changes required extensive legislation, a
separate provision of the bill authorizing the new article specified
that all provisions relating to the supreme court, the court of appeals and the circuit court would be effective January 1, 1976, less
than 60 days after passage of the article." But, the Kentucky legislature is in session a mere 60 days every two years, and it was not
scheduled to convene until spring of 1976.
Nevertheless, on January 1, 1976, Kentucky's judiciary was governed by a constitution establishing a new judicial system and inconsistent statutory law, which related to the former structure and
remained effective until properly repealed. Speedy implementation
was needed to eliminate this discrepancy.'"
Governor Julian M. Carroll delegated primary drafting responsibility to the Office of Judicial Planning, the predecessor of the Administrative Office of the Courts.' 3 To provide drafters with desperately needed information on the status of the existing system as well
as proposals for change in accord with the new article, the governor
also appointed an ad hoc committee of public officials and concerned citizens. A number of circuit judges also advised the drafters.
The drafting groups worked closely with the legislative research
commission of the general assembly. They circulated outlines and
initial drafts among themselves and solicited comments from
everyone involved in the process.
To expedite legislative consideration of the proposals, the house
and senate judiciary committees divided into two groups. One group
considered implementation of the new article, while the other considered technical court matters.
Before the proposals ever reached the floor of the legislature, the
drafters had gathered extensive data, discussed innumerable proposals and revised countless drafts. When the legislature finally
addressed the package in the spring, it passed with ease.
41. 1974 Ky. Acts. ch. 84 § 3 (S. B. 183). By the terms of a corresponding section,
implementation of the district court could be temporarily deferred because this court would
not come into existence until January, 1978. See 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 84, § 2(a) (S. B. 183).
42. This example illustrates the effectiveness of the Zollschan-Smith model in explaining
the dynamics of the implementation process. See Smith, supra note 1.
43. The narrative of the process of drafting implementing legislation has been condensed
from Staff of the Administrative Office of the Courts, Kentucky's New Court System: An
Overview 41 KY. BENCH AND B. 13, 31-33 (1977).
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Another step was to determine how much implementing legislation was needed. In its regular 1976 session, the legislature repealed
Chapter 21 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS), which related
to the former court of appeals, and replaced it with KRS Chapter
22, which converted the court of appeals into the supreme court.
The new chapter retained a number of substantive provisions from
the former law, but it was still necessary to change names, titles,
and some functions and responsibilities. Section 116 of the Constitution left matters relating to the jurisdiction of the supreme court,
appointment of commissioners and other court personnel, rules of
practice and procedure for the judiciary, and admission and discipline of members of the bar to implement by supreme court rule.
To establish the court of appeals the legislature added an entirely
new chapter to KRS. This chapter was modeled after the chapter
creating the supreme court, although their provisions respecting
titles and jurisdictions differed.
The trial court of general jurisdiction, the circuit court, remained
relatively unchanged under the new judicial article, but a number
of statutes were required merely to coordinate the circuit court with
the new district court. Consequently, the legislature repealed Chapters 23 and 24 of the KRS and replaced them with Chapters 23A and
24A. Most of the provisions establishing circuit boundaries and
numbers of judges remained unchanged in the new statutes. However, the jurisdiction of the circuit court was altered slightly in order
to eliminate all concurrent jurisdiction, except felony examining
trials between the circuit and district courts. Additionally, several
new provisions were required to make the circuit court a court of
continuous session.
Implementing the new district court required considerably more
time, study and analysis, because the new court completely replaced a maze of limited jurisdiction trial courts. When drafting the
new judicial article, the legislature wisely authorized additional
time to implement the district court by deferring its effective date
for two years.
Before implementing legislation for the district courts could be
drafted, a number of preliminary issues had to be resolved. For
example, the legislature had to determine the jurisdiction and location of the district courts and the number, salaries and time for
election of the district judges. It also had to determine the salaries
and duties of auxiliary court personnel, including clerks, court reporters and trial commissioners. Other issues to be addressed in-
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cluded: the amount and disposition of filing fees, fines, forfeitures
and costs; the availability of court facilities and courtroom security;
and the extension of the jury system to the district courts.
To resolve these issues, the governor reconvened the ad hoc committee in July, 1976. A number of other advisory groups volunteered
their expertise. The Administrative Office of the Courts, which had
been created by statute in 1976, appointed an advisory committee
of lower court judges, circuit clerks and attorneys. This committee
subdivided into two groups: one studied budget and operations; the
other studied legislation and rules. The attorney general's office
created a special consumer's committee to study the feasibility of a
small claims division for the new court and to draft the necessary
enabling legislation. Still another advisory group considered the
impact of the new article on the juvenile justice system and drafted
legislation relating to juvenile jurisdiction.
To resolve problems about the staffing and location of the courts,
the Administrative Office of the Courts engaged the services of a
consulting firm. The firm's staff conducted a weighted case load
study to project a satisfactory balance between the number of people and amount of time needed to process cases effectively. The
Administrative Office, in turn, relied upon the results of this study
in their recommendations to the legislature.
As they had done earlier in the year, all groups maintained close
contact with the legislative committees while they drafted the bills.
Initial drafts were proposed, debated, and revised. Finally, a special
session of the legislature, convened in December, 1976, considered
and passed the enabling legislation.
Although the new supreme court and court of appeals have existed since January, 1976, and the district courts began to hear cases
in January, 1978, the process of implementation is not yet complete.
Inadequacies or inconsistencies in the enabling legislation will have
to be adjusted by new laws. Other difficulties encountered during
the transition may be remedied by rule or administrative order.
Many of the difficulties associated with the novelty of the system
and public unfamiliarity with it will simply require a number of
years to elapse before the implementation process transforms the
Kentucky judiciary into the unified court of justice envisioned and
mandated by the constitution.
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Systemic Problems and Remedies

The Kentucky example illustrates how much the success of a
policy depends on adequate implementation. Certainly, programs
may fail because of artificially high expectations or inadequate policies, but they may also fail from faulty implementation." Because
the implementation process is so crucial to effecting social or political change, a map of potential pitfalls to avoid may guide implementers in making decisions.
1.

Lack of Information

Even after a constitutional provision, statute or rule authorizes
court unification, implementation may be seriously hampered by a
lack of information. For example, as Kentucky illustrates, the 1975
judicial article authorized the creation of two entirely new courts:
the intermediate court of appeals and the district court. In both
cases, but particularly for the district court, implementers needed
to determine new court locations and facilities, numbers of judges
and support staff, and salaries, and duties for all court personnel.
Very little information from the former system was available to
assist them in addressing these issues. Even where information
44. Preface to PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2, at xvi-xvii. See also Sorg, supra note
1. Sorg asserts that our interest in implementation stems from studies which suggest that
government policies may fail if they are not implemented completely or as planned. Id. at 1.
The observations of Pressman, Wildavsky & Sorg are corroborated by Richard Rose, who
stated in his study of attempted implementation of management by objectives within the
Office of Management and Budget:
Implementation does not guarantee a program's success; it is merely a precondition of
success. In analytic terms implementation is an intervening variable in the policy
process, which starts with the statement of policy intentions or aspirations and moves
through program choice to implementation and, finally to an evaluation of the consequences of what has been done.
Rose, Implementation and Evaporation: The Record of MBO, 37 PUB. ADM. REv. 64, 66
(1977). As Rose explains, if the consequences of a program differ from the expectations of
those who sponsored it, this discrepancy is a function of implementation. "The consequences
immediately reflect what government has done to implement previous aspirations and expectations," he asserts. Id. Drawing upon Pressman & Wildavsky, Rose recommends that policy
makers consider implementation issues as they develop policy. This could help to eliminate
problems encountered in implementing policies. But he adds:
If all the difficulties could be foreseen in advance, then often a program would not be
started. Implementation is not only a matter of forging "links in a causal chain so as
to obtain the desired results:" it is more a matter of learning by doing-including
learning what to do when the links are not closed and the chain breaks.
Id., quoting PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2.
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could be located, it was usually inadequate, incomplete, or extremely parochial. Most localities collected different data by different procedures, and the information could not be compared from
one county to the next.
As a result, both the legislature and the Administrative Office of
the Courts were often forced to act without adequate information.
The unsatisfactory results which followed decisions made upon little
or no knowledge were summarized by one involved participant who
stated, "The Administrative Office did not know what they were
doing. AOC was unprepared."
Implementers in Idaho attempted to collect data on the limited
jurisdiction trial courts so that they could consolidate them into the
magistrate courts. Although providing data to the implementers
was purely voluntary, most localities cooperated willingly. Nevertheless, as one participant bemoaned, "The statistics were totally
unreliable. There were so many omitted cases that it was impossible
to make comparisons." Sources in Kansas, South Dakota and Alabama expressed similar frustration with the unavailability of relevant data upon which to restructure their judicial systems.
Lack of information is hardly an insurmountable problem. To
cope with the need for information, most states have authorized
consulting firms to conduct special studies of their judiciaries. The
results obtained have enabled reformers to ascertain the specific
measures necessary to implement unification." The experiences of
the states visited strongly suggest that problems arising from lack
of information can be considerably diminished by a comprehensive
court study. Of course, the study must be properly conducted and
addressed to the problems at issue to provide the information implementers require.
In a recent article, Harry 0. Lawson, former Colorado State Court
Administrator, suggests how to design and organize a successful
court study." Lawson isolates four items which are important for a
successful undertaking: timing; overall responsibilities; staffing;
and scope and content. He then expounds upon each of these categories.
45. It must be cautioned that a court study can be conducted at any stage of the reform
process: before any reforms are proposed; prior to implementation; or after unification is
adopted. Although the discussion of court studies in the text concentrates on studies conducted to gather information needed for implementation, this discussion is equally applicable
to court studies conducted at other stages in the reform process.
46. Lawson's suggestions have been excerpted from Lawson, Commentary on the Process
of Change, 1974 Amz. ST. L.J. 627 (1974).
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With respect to timing, Lawson recommends that the study be
conducted in three separate phases. The first phase should consist
of a limited technical review of existing statutes and rules. This will
enable implementers to determine which statutes and rules must be
repealed and which ones can be amended to conform to new requirements. In the second phase, the study group should identify all
areas of fundamental change where reformers agree on methods of
implementation. For example, he suggests implementers may agree
upon the court rules and legislation required to define the administrative authority of the supreme court. These agreed changes can be
implemented while the overall study is being conducted. The final
phase of the study should address areas enshrouded by doubt, controversy or lack of information. In this phase the study group should
address long range plans for future needs and development.
Second, Lawson recommends that responsibility for conducting
the study be vested in a commission composed of representatives
from the legislature, judiciary, executive, press and concerned citizens. If this commission is a fair cross-section of the population,
Lawson contemplates that the commission will become a semipermanent body that continually studies the court system.
A third recommendation stresses the importance of using inhouse staff to conduct the court study. Lawson sees several unique
advantages in employing a local research staff. The staff would
already be somewhat aware of the needs and problems of the system. It also "would have more credibility with the study commission than outside experts, who would spend only limited time in the
state, make their recommendations, and leave."'" The sensitivity to
the system's problems, which the staff would gain, would provide
excellent training for future employment in the court administrator's office. Finally, the study commission would have more control
over the scope and content of the study by employing an in-house
staff than by engaging an outside consulting firm.
Fourth, the scope and content of the study can cover a variety of
different topics. Lawson outlines seven topics and recommends issues pertinent to each topic. (1) The commission may wish to consider the problems of the lower and special courts. It could analyze
their organization and operation, identify problems such as case
backlog, and plan for improvements. (2) Another area of concern is
budget and finance. The commission may wish to assess the cost of
47.

Id. at 636.
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operating the system, determine new procedures for budgeting and
accounting, and establish fiscal priorities for the judiciary. (3) Records management is another fertile topic for the commission to
study. It may inventory the types and variety of records and equipment, the record-keeping system, and the procedures for storing and
destroying records. Based on this information it may recommend
new, uniform procedures for maintaining records. (4) The commission may also monitor case flow, evaluating the movement of cases
through the courts, as well as judge and case load ratios to develop
standards of performance for courts to follow. (5) A study of the
information system will provide data on case processing and financial administration. To aid decision-making in this area, the commission should concentrate on determining the data needed by an
information system; the feasibility and limitations of using an automated system; the merits of using such a system for case monitoring
as well as fiscal administration; and the type of system which best
serves the needs of the state. (6) Court facilities provide a sixth topic
for commission study. The commission may inventory the existing
facilities, determine their adequacy, assess future needs and develop long range plans. (7) Finally, the commission may address
problems relating to auxiliary court personnel. It may analyze the
number and qualifications of such personnel; their salaries and
fringe benefits and the possibility of incorporating decisions about
these issues into a statewide personnel plan. Although it is possible
that information for some of these issues may be available prior to
a court study, Lawson asserts that detailed facts about these issues,
collected from a court study or otherwise, will greatly enhance a
state's ability to implement court unification.
Lack of reporting or inconsistent reporting by many localities may
prevent implementers from obtaining all the data they require to
address every problem. Nevertheless, conducting the type of court
study suggested by Lawson will provide enough data to allow informed drafting of legislation, rules and orders. Additionally, the
type of court study Lawson recommends will help to resolve a second systemic problem that many implementers confront: coordination and cooperation.
2.

Insufficient Coordinationand Cooperation

Coordination and cooperation problems arise at two different levels: external and internal. The external problems derive from the
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delicate balance of power which exists among the three branches of
government. Court unification generally gives the judiciary additional authority vis-a-vis the executive and legislative branches.
The perceived or actual diminution of legislative and executive authority over the courts often makes actors in these branches reluc48
tant to help with implementation.

Two types of internal coordination and cooperation problems can
hamper implementation. First, sometimes the people in charge of
implementing court unification are indifferent or opposed to it.
They fear unification will undermine their prestige or reduce their
autonomy. Second, trial judges and lower court personnel often resist implementation, because they fear they will lose authority and
possibly even their jobs when unification is fully implemented."
One solution to these problems, which is generally accepted in the
literature on implementation, assumes that people are content with
the status quo and antagonistic to change. The way to neutralize
their opposition and even to encourge their support is to involve
them in the process of change and not to impose it from outside or
from a higher authority. 50 Professor Neely Gardner supports this
theory, stating:
It is by assisting in collecting the data, defining the problem,
and experimenting with possible solutions that people learn
and change. Therefore, an effective change process improves
the problem-solving capabilities of the system. And if the process implies changing, rather than simply one discrete and
final change, each cycle of change provides for reevaluation and
further change. This process releases the energy and fosters the
growth of the people in the system."
48. Administering a Unified Court System, address by Harry 0. Lawson, Joint Session
of the Conference of Chief Justices and National Conference of Court Administrative Officers,
St. Louis, Missouri (August 6, 1970).
49. Id.
50. Ashman, Planningand Organizinga Court Study: Initiating the Change Process, in
COURT STUDY PROCESS 97 (Solomon ed. 1975); Gardner, supra note 1; Gross et. al., supra note
2; PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2; Solomon, A Guide to Conducting Court Studies, in
COURT STUDY PROCESS 1 (Solomon ed. 1975).
51. Gardner, supra note 1, at 182. Gardner emphasizes that institutional change can best
be accomplished if the people who are affected by the change work together with outside
experts, who can help them adjust. He cautions against commanding change by fiat, even
from a legitimate authority, such as the legislature or the courts. He recognizes the advantages that can be gained by using an outside consulting firm to study the system and recommend changes. But, he stresses, even expert recommendations will not make the change
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Many of the states visited appointed blue ribbon committees,
which had representatives of the legislature or which worked with
the legislature, to prepare implementing legislation. These teams,
often with advice from outside consulting firms, were able to draft
bills which could bring about the goals of a unified court system
without engendering substantial legislative opposition. Even in Alabama, where objections that the legislation would be too costly delayed passage until the last day of the legislative session, the bill
had enough proponents in the legislature to forestall attempts to
defeat it. 2 The importance of allowing those affected by the change
to become involved in bringing it about can be illustrated by the
contrasting role of the primary and secondary implementers.
Usually the primary implementer in the states visited was the state
court administrator's office. 53 Members of this office had often been
involved in the initial campaign for court unification. They frequently assisted with drafting the implementing legislation and
helped smooth difficulties throughout the implementation process.
Secondary implementers, on the other hand, were usually trial
judges and court clerks, with a vested interest in the status quo.
Often they had perceived criticism of the nonunified system as assertions that their performance was inadequate. Thus, when they
were charged with implementing some aspects of the unified system, they were often reluctant to comply. Although the people interviewed in the eleven states visited indicated that the intransigence
of lower court personnel was only a temporary problem, states could
mitigate this problem, in whole or in part, by involving their lower
court personnel from the beginning in the work of implementation.
easier unless the people affected by the change become involved in institutionalizing the
advice. See generally id. at 97-106.
52. See Martin, Bill to Implement Reform Signed by Alabama's Wallace, 59 JUDICATURE
255 (1975). Indeed, the implementing legislation passed the senate by a 30-0 vote. Id. The
Alabama Advisory Commission on Judicial Article Implementation, appointed by Chief Justice Howell Heflin, exemplifies a broadly representative commission. It was composed of
prominent citizens from all parts of the state and included representatives of all aspects of
the state judicial system: judges, clerks, registers, district attorneys, and lawyers. It also
included members of the state legislature and officials from local governments. See Anvisoay
ON JUDICIAL ARicLE IMPLEMENTATION, REPORT OF THE ADvIsoRy CoMssSIoN ON
JUDICIAL ARTICLE IMPLEMENTATION (1975).
COMMISSION

53. In Florida, the Judicial Council took charge of implementing until the Office of State
Courts' Administrator was created.
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Inadequate Funds

Financial difficulties represent a third systemic problem. First, a
court study, whether conducted by an outside consulting firm, a
task force of state citizens or a combination of both, is costly. Second, each of the elements of unification costs money. Transcription
equipment, new or remodeled facilities, computer systems and increased personnel costs all place a strain on limited state or local
resources.
The cost of court unification can be reduced or minimized by
several means. First, implementers may apply for federal funds to
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) or for
state or private funds. Several of the states selected for on-site visits
used these methods. Although outside funds prove very useful at the
beginning, ultimately the grants expire and states must secure other
methods of meeting expenses. By that time, cost may not be a major
problem. The state (or political subdivision where state financing
does not accompany other elements of unification) will have had a
number of years to adjust its budget to the new system. Indeed, the
government may have increased fees and transferred them to the
state treasury to allow for increased expenditures.
Moreover, start-up costs are often the most expensive part of
unification. Once initial monies are spent, increases may be controlled, and maintenance costs may remain stable or even decrease.
For example, although the equipment for the Kansas tape system
was expensive, implementers expect maintenance to cost less than
hiring additional court reporters.
Implementers believe the elimination of de novo trials will decrease expenses and streamlined personnel systems and better administration will decrease other costs. During the ten years from
1965 to 1975, Colorado added only 37 percent more personnel to
handle a 78 percent increase in case filings. A New York administrator expects similar results for his state.
However, as the New Yorker cautioned, with inflation, new programs and the creation of additional positions in the judiciary, the
total cost may increase. But one individual in Colorado reported,
"Overall it will probably cost more money. Upgrading costs are
analogous to the city manager system. There are savings in some
areas, but professionalism costs. The results are better, however."
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4. Inadequate Lead Time
The fourth systemic implementation problem is inadequate lead
time. Insufficient time often causes hasty planning, which in turn
leads to faulty implementation.
In a number of the states studied, participants complained that
they did not have enough time to weigh alternatives. Additional
problems arose when measures were instituted very rapidly, before
campaigns to educate members of the judiciary were planned. Much
resentment could have been avoided if implementers had moved
more slowly. "The problem," as one Idaho participant commented,
"was that no one was prepared."
Many of the difficulties created by insufficient lead time can be
avoided by planning and by implementing court unification one
step at a time.54 There are several ways to implement court unification gradually. In some states the elements of unification have been
introduced in stages. Alabama and South Dakota have staggered
implementation of state financing over a three year period; New
York has allowed four years. Although the methods vary from the
chargeback used in South Dakota and New York, to the increased
proportionate share in Alabama, the net result is that during each
year of implementation, the state becomes responsible for a larger
5
share of the judicial budget.1
Another way states can implement court unification gradually is
by delaying the effective date of the reform for a period of time. In
Connecticut, a 1976 statute authorized the merger of the juvenile
and common pleas courts into the superior court. The effective date
of this merger, however, was July, 1978. Similarly, in Kentucky the
judicial article creating the district court was approved in 1975. The
54. See Van Meter & Van Horn, supra note 1. Van Meter and Van Horn assert that both
these factors correlate highly with effective implementation. They note, "[pirograms that
require major change frequently lead to goal conflict on the part of relevant actors, while goal
consensus is usually highest where little change is involved." Id. at 460. Implementing minor
changes over a period of time (incrementalism) enhances goal consensus. Goal consensus, in
turn, allows implementation to proceed more smoothly.
55. The chargeback works as follows. The state pays the entire judicial budget and
charges back a share of its expense to the counties. In a system that is completely funded by
the county, the state would charge back 100% of the cost; in a system that is completely
funded by the state, it would not have to charge back anything. When state financing is
implemented gradually, the state decreases periodically the amount charged to the county.
The increased proportionate share can be implemented two ways: the state may increase
expenditures for the courts by a fixed percentage at periodic intervals or it can pay for more
line items in the budget over a period of time.
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legislature enacted implementing legislation in 1976, but the district court did not begin hearing cases until January, 1978. The bad
weather that winter gave Kentucky an additional bonus. One implementer explained, "the courts were slow at first because of the bad
weather. It was a good time to get our procedures adjusted before
the onslaught of humanity began to parade through the courts in the
spring."
Regardless of the method states use, staggered implementation
allows time for planning. In turn, planning improves coordination
and cooperation. Planning at this stage should not be equated with
conducting a court study to obtain information. At this point implementers must use the information from the court study to develop
effective implementation techniques. This not only allows the techniques to be tailored to the needs of an individual judicial system,
it also enables members of the judiciary to grow accustomed to the
new system through educational campaigns. Combined with gradual implementation, planning minimizes the disruptive effects of
unification. "A lot can be avoided by pre-planning," commented an
Idaho implementer. "Planning is a necessary prerequisite. Planning
and an administrative office are extremely important, especially for
continuity." Often, the problems that cannot be addressed by gradual implementation or planning will simply dissipate over time. The
adage, "Time heals all wounds," is appropriate. As time passes,
novelty becomes routine.
In sum, implementers may confront at least four different types
of systemic problems: lack of information; insufficient coordination
and cooperation; inadequate funds; and inadequate lead time. Although these problems can easily confound implementation, they
are not insurmountable. For example, a properly conducted court
study will obtain critical information which implementers need to
fashion appropriate statutes, rules or orders. Coordination and cooperation can be enhanced by involving the people affected, even
where outside expertise is also required. Funding can be obtained
from federal or private sources, and costs may decrease over time.
Finally, gradual implementation and adequate planning may resolve problems created by insufficient lead time.
IV.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES OF IMPLEMENTATION

A state may apply all the correct solutions to systemic problems
and still confront a number of difficulties implementing court unification. Pressman and Wildavsky's study of implementation illus-
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trates how policies can founder as they become enmeshed in a labyrinth of technical difficulties. In their book they emphasize that
despite the commitment and concern of policy makers, unforeseen
"technical details" make implementation infinitely more difficult
than planners anticipate. As a result, they assert:
Promises can create hope, but unfulfilled promises can lead to
disillusionment and frustration. By concentrating on the implementation of programs, as well as their initiation, we should
be able to increase the probability that policy promises will be
realized. Fewer promises may be made in view of a heightened
awareness of the obstacles to their fulfillment, but more of
them should be kept. 51
In the eleven states selected for in-depth investigation, technical
difficulties plagued implementers. But, as a rule, the states studied
were not able to learn from comparable experiences elsewhere.
Certainly, as Pressman and Wildavsky suggest, understanding
the potential for setbacks may cause less ambitious predictions
about performance. Indeed, this may be the inevitable result of a
study about implementation failures. Yet, if the only value of studying implementation is to discover excuses for failing, the study has
not helped implementers or policy makers reach their goals. Presumably, one value of a study such as this is to provide implementers with information which enables them to avoid the pitfalls of
those -who have preceded them.
A.

Trial Court Consolidation
1.

Case Filing and Processing

The creation, elimination or merger of various courts alters the
places, methods and procedures of filing and processing cases. A
major problem of implementing these changes is to effect a smooth
transition between the old system and the new one.
a.

Effect on Citizens

Court consolidation affects citizens who use the courts. Suddenly
they must file cases in new courts or before new judges. Frequently
they must travel to new locations to do so. In fact, two Kentucky
56.

PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note

2, at 6.
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judges remarked that changes in the titles of courts caused confusion among the citizens. At the time of the comments, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals had become the Supreme Court and a new Court
of Appeals had been created. 7 Although the problem might be
solved by publicizing changes through the media, most states have
used the media more during the political campaign than during
implementation.
The loss of local judges also caused a problem for Kentucky citizens. As one Kentucky implementer explained, "Judges are an integral part of the political balance of power because a judgeship is a
local institution. A major political problem is the emotionalism of
local people resulting from the loss of local judges."
After the circuit and district court systems were in effect for several months, the resentment about losing local courts subsided. Indeed, Kentucky judges and citizens now point proudly to their new
courts, where litigants may receive just and fair treatment. As one
person commented, "There are more people in court and more people paying fines. The word is out, you can't fix cases in Kentucky
any more. The 'good old buddy' system is gone."
Idaho citizens experienced similar difficulties. Before unification
the judicial system contained 266 limited jurisdiction trial courts.
Every court had two or three judges, regardless of the size or the
population of the county where it was located. Trial court consolidation reduced the number of magistrates to 60.1 An Idaho interviewee described the effect of the consolidation on the citizens:
"Initially there was great dissatisfaction with the legislature because the courts were taken from the people. Citizens felt they have
lost contact with the courts." But Idaho administrators devised a
solution to combat this alienation. Idaho magistrates are required
to travel within their county so that the judiciary maintains close
contact with local areas.
b.

Transfer of Pending Cases

When new courts are created, jurisdiction is altered and old courts
are eliminated. To complete the transition, implementers must
57. It is reasonable to assume this confusion was aggravated in January, 1978 when the
district court replaced four limited jurisdiction trial courts.
58. At least one magistrate sits in each of Idaho's 44 counties. Magistrate commissions,
sitting in each judicial district, may authorize additional magistrate positions for Idaho's
more populous counties.
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transfer pending cases and insure that new cases are filed in the
proper court.
First they must determine if cases will transfer. This determination depends in part on which model of consolidation the state has
followed. Often, no problem will arise. In Kentucky, where the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not affected by the changes in the
limited jurisdiction trial courts, no problem of transferring cases
pending in the circuit courts arose. Similarly, Colorado had few
difficulties because JP courts were non-record courts with no case
files to transfer and because there was enough lead time to allow a
smooth transfer of probate, juvenile, mental health and civil cases
from the old county court to the district court.
If it is necessary to transfer cases, implementers must determine
which ones will transfer. Kentucky, which had no trouble with cases
pending in its circuit court, found this problem particularly acute
for the district courts, where four courts were incorporated into one.
Even after the legislature decided to establish only one limited jurisdiction trial court, some people urged that jurisdiction of juvenile
and probate matters remain in the county court. "It was only after
much thought and misgiving," explained a Kentucky implementer,
"that these requests were rejected."
Where it was necessary to transfer pending cases to another court,
states confronted a related problem: what procedure should be used
to transfer the cases? They solved this problem several ways. The
Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration specify that all transferred cases shall be designated by an easily identified colored
sticker which is attached to the file and docket sheet and which
states, "Transfered from
- Court
- County."5 Another
method was used in Colorado, where administrators renumbered all
transferred cases and indexed and stored inactive ones.
c.

Standardized Forms and Filing Procedures

Another problem implementers confront once they consolidate
trial courts and transfer pending cases is creating standardized
forms and procedures for the new system. For example, Idaho standardized records, folders, stationery and forms, including some judgment forms 0 Implementers used forms developed in New Jersey
59. ALABAMA RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, R. 42(A).
60. Idaho implementers have had difficulty establishing a system of uniform docket numbers. Each of Idaho's 44 clerks (one per county) has a different numbering system for docketed
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and Colorado as prototypes, and aside from the time and expense
required to change stamps, methods of filing and fee codes, they
experienced little difficulty instituting the new forms and procedures. Both Alabama and South Dakota have standardized some
court forms and have instituted uniform docket fees.
d.

Courts of Record

The constitutional or statutory provisions creating a new court
structure often require that all courts be of record. This requirement
creates another problem for implementers: How will the record be
made?
Traditionally, if a record of the courtroom proceeding was required, the transcription was taken by a court reporter. When a
unified system requires more court reporters, two problems may
result: there may be a shortage of court reporters or they may be too
expensive. States may avoid the problems and expense of hiring
extra court reporters by introducing modem electronic transcription
equipment into the system as implementers in Idaho and Kentucky
have done. In fact the tape recorders for Kentucky's district courts
have worked so well that six circuit judges have decided to replace
their court reporters with tape recorders. But, tape recorders and
other electronic devices may cause problems of their own. The initial outlay for recording equipment usually exceeds the cost of a
single court reporter. Frequently, either the equipment or the courtrooms must be adapted to produce clear recordings.
In order to use recording equipment, which was purchased with
$15,000 from five federal grants, Wyandotte County had to redesign many of its courtrooms. Installing accoustical tile and laying
rugs added $7,000 to the cost of the recording equipment. After
the system was completed, court personnel in the county liked the
equipment. One interviewee remarked: "We should have done it
long ago. Unification was the impetus.
e.

Case Record Maintenance

Maintaining records of cases involves two separate problems: one
is finding enough space to store records and the second is transferring records to the right place so they can be retrieved if needed.
cases within that county. In an attempt to resolve this problem, some administrators have
prepared a district court clerk's manual to standardize docket numbers.
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In some states trial court consolidation creates no unique storage
problems. For example, in Alabama, records are stored in the same
places that they were before unification. The situation in Kansas is
slightly different. Shawnee County files cases in four storage areas
which correspond with the former clerks' offices. Although none of
the storage areas alone is adequate to hold all the cases, for now,
with all four storage areas in use, the county has enough space. In
the future, as case filings multiply, microfilming of case records, a
concept which was adopted in Idaho, may be one of few feasible
solutions to the problem of limited storage space. In the alternative
a state may adopt a record retention and destruction plan that will
either transfer the old cases to the state archives, destroy them or
do some of both.
Closely related to the problem of adequate storage space is storing
the file in the proper location so that the record can be retrieved if
needed. Idaho has an ingenious solution to this problem. By statute
certain records cannot be destroyed. Therefore, all records are microfilmed and transferred to the Idaho Historical Society by court
order.
2.

Court personnel

Trial court consolidation not only causes problems with processing cases, but it also causes staffing problems.
a.

Qualifications: Non-Lawyer Judges

Often constitutional amendments which consolidate courts include a provision requiring judges in the new system to be lawyers.
These provisions can create serious staffing problems.
Under the Florida constitution, for example, non-lawyer judges
may only serve in county courts in counties with a population of
40,000 or less." All circuit judges and county court judges in counties with a population over 40,000 must be attorneys. In one Florida
county with a population under 40,000 a non-lawyer defeated a
sitting judge for a county court judgeship. The defeated judge was
a lawyer who had been a member of the bar more than five years
and, thus, was qualified to serve as a circuit court judge. (This fact
is important because non-lawyer judges do not have jurisdiction
61.

FLA. CONST. art. V. § 20(c)(1).
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over certain matters such as juvenile, probate and incompetency
proceedings.) After the defeated judge left the bench, the closest
circuit judge was 65 miles away in Apalachicola. But the Apalachicola circuit judge was often transfered elsewhere and thus did not
hold daily court in Apalachicola. This presented a frustrating dilemma for litigants with pressing matters that could not be heard
by a non-lawyer judge.
One reason for difficulties such as this is that not enough lawyers
practice in the rural areas of some states to make practical a requirement that all judges be lawyers. Florida tried to compensate for the
lack of lawyers in some areas by permitting non-lawyer judges in the
least populated counties. Kansas and Idaho tried a different approach. Although magistrates in Idaho and district magistrate
judges in Kansas may be non-lawyers, both of these states require
that non-lawyer judges attend special training institutes. Educational requirements do not completely solve problems caused by
limiting the jurisdiction of non-lawyer judges, but they do insure
that non-lawyer judges receive some judicial training before they
serve on the bench.
b.

Retention and Hiring of Auxiliary Personnel

A unified court must be staffed by an adequate number of secretaries, clerks, bailiffs and other auxiliary personnel.
States prefer to retain employees from the former system where
possible. Usually this poses no problem, but where unification has
merged or eliminated many courts, implementers may discover that
there are more employees than positions to fill. Both Shawnee and
Wyandotte Counties in Kansas had too many auxiliary personnel
after unification. Although both counties promised to retain all
employees from the previous system, it was not easy to find a job
for everyone.
The Kentucky implementing legislation passed in the 1976 special session permitted district court judges to hire secretaries upon
a showing of need but appropriated no funds to pay them. This
problem was not resolved in the 1978 session of the legislature,
which adjourned March 18. Normally the clerks' offices could supply secretaries or assume secretarial duties, but the legislature also
reduced the number of clerks. One administrator said, "we have
invented a hodgepodge of solutions to solve the problems, but the
solutions have only worked in about 70% of the cases." In larger
counties, which had a greater need for secretaries, the clerks often
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assigned a deputy to the district judges. In the smaller counties, the
local governments often advanced funds to pay for secretaries or the
courts hired them with CETA (Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act) funds.
c.

Status Problems

Trial court consolidation often causes court employees to feel uncomfortable about their new role vis-a-vis other court personnel.
Three typical problems occurred in Idaho.
First, although Idaho implementers decided to create a limited
jurisdiction division of the district court, they initially did not know
what to call the new division. Apparently the legislature listened to
district court judges who did not want these other judicial officers
to be called judges. Thus, they were named magistrates. As one
close observer said, "The legislature simply set the title. There was
no opportunity to challenge, but magistrates have always resented
the title." Perhaps these judicial officers feel they have less status
because they are called magistrates.
A second problem, reported by an Idaho attorney, is tension between lay and lawyer magistrates. He noted, however, that some
counties have so few lawyers that the legislature could not realistically have passed a bill providing for only lawyer magistrates.
Still a third problem has been experienced by magistrates who
had been judges under the former system. Before unification they
had been relatively autonomous within their assigned jurisdiction.
They controlled not only their own budget, but also the personnel
of their court. Now they depend on the district court for line items
in the budget and for staff, and many of them resent the loss of their
independence. The problem is less serious than it might have been
if all former judges had been retained. 2 As one judge remarked,
"most of the magistrates are new and don't present a problem."
Kansas experienced the opposite problem. Many of the associate
district judges had been magistrates under the former system. With
unification, they were elevated to associate district judgeships, and
their jurisdiction was expanded considerably. Except for mandamus
and quo warranto matters, associate district judges may hear the
same cases as district court judges. This rapid escalation of author62. In Idaho, all judges had to reapply to the magistrates' commission for judgeships after
their term had expired. A number of them simply did not reapply.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 419

ity and prestige caused some rivalry between these two classes of
district judges for a period of time.
In one Kansas county, unification created a major status problem
among the court clerks. When unification merged four courts in
Shawnee County into one, it also eliminated the jobs of three of the
four court clerks. Although the displaced clerks were given positions
in the office of the single county court clerk, their status had been
diminished and they felt their responsibilities had been usurped. It
was also difficult to merge personalities and standardize operations,
particularly because a number of latent personality conflicts
emerged when the clerks' offices were rearranged. This problem,
however, has subsided over time.
3.

Facilitiesand Equipment

Trial court consolidation frequently requires changes in the facilities and equipment used by the judiciary. These changes, too, represent a problem of implementation.
a. Adapting Old Facilities
A state may not have enough properly equipped courtrooms for
the unified system. In Kansas, after unification merged civil and
criminal matters into one court, courtrooms were too small and
courthouses did not have enough detention blocks for defendants,
deliberation rooms for juries, or courtrooms for judges. Now the
State is renovating inadequate courtrooms to relieve the problem.
Judges in Idaho experienced similar difficulties. One Ada County
judge arrived at the courthouse for a trial; discovered no courtrooms
were available; and had to adjourn the case for a day. He explained
the predicament to a member of the press, who was covering the
courthouse that day. As a result, a story in the evening news criticized the county commissioners for inadequate planning. Within
one week, the commissioners received bids for two new courtrooms,
and, shortly thereafter, they approved plans to construct new facilities.
b.

Constructing New Facilities

New construction can often improve insufficient or outmoded
courthouses. But new construction requires planning, time and
money. Because Shawnee County, Kansas, did not start building
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until after they had a crisis, the transition inconvenienced many
judges and their staffs.
Kentucky, on the other hand, contracted early for new and expanded district court buildings. Additionally, implementers in that
state are consolidating office space and remodeling courthouses for
multi-purpose use.
c.

Equipment

Another problem implementers encounter when they consolidate
trial courts is furnishing all courts with suitable equipment. To
accomplish this task they must transfer working equipment to new
courts, eliminate archaic equipment and purchase new equipment
where necessary. Alabama had a rather unusual problem with
equipment. When implementers in that state inventoried the equipment in the local trial courts, which they hoped to transfer to the
unified system, they discovered that most of it was either outmoded
and unusable or personally owned by former court employees. The
state thus had to furnish the courts with essential equipment.
After an initial outlay, economies of scale and proper techniques
for inventorying equipment should enable administrators to equip
the courts adequately at a moderate cost.
C.

Centralized Administration and Management
1.

Collection and Use of Data

Implementing a mandate to centralize administration causes different problems. One of the primary challenges implementers confront is devising a method to collect and use data generated or
needed by the courts, particularly to keep track of case filings and
dispositions.
a. Collection of Data: Records and Supplies
Management
Administrators have found that a statewide case reporting system
helps them collect important data and a computer helps them analyze it. Idaho obtained a federal grant to establish a sophisticated
computer system. With funds from the grant, the Administrative
Director of the Courts hired a computer operator. To feed information to the computer, the administrative office devised a procedure
for daily statewide reporting of the docketing, calendaring, filing,
and disposition of cases. At first court personnel did not like to
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complete the daily reports. As one Idaho observer commented, "It's
a little form. Judges have to complete it each day. It comes to them
from district court clerks or the administrative office. The clerks
should fill it out, but they are either too dumb or have no time."
Despite reporting difficulties, the computer has helped. It permits
the administrative office to maintain a uniform record of the status
of every case filed in the state. A clerk monitors the computer printout and reports on any major events. With this information, the
administrative director can make annual plans with goals .the courts
can meet.
Implementers may learn a lesson from Colorado's experience with
computers. In 1967 the state court administrator's office tried to use
a computer to collate comparable data from the state's courts. This
attempt failed, partially because the system was too complicated for
a first attempt and partially because the date from the various
courts were not comparable. Ultimately, the court administrator's
office engaged a private consulting firm to assist in developing a
modem, efficient system with its own hardware and staff.
Colorado also had problems overcoming local resistance to the
computer. With respect to the initial system, one observer commented, "Judges disapproved of the information system at first.
They could not rely on the output. It was not timely or correct."
Local clerks resisted the system because it involved more work for
them.
After the second attempt remedied the most flagrant defects,
attitudes began to change. "Judges have come to recognize the need
for it, at least for the state court administrator," a Colorado computer expert explained. Based on Colorado's experiences that individual recommends, "Start with a simple system at one level first
- then expand. This reduces opposition."
Although the computer system is costly, it has benefitted Colorado significantly. It has provided comparable statistics which facilitate case processing and personnel management. The state court
administrator's office uses it to monitor cases, plan for trials and
reduce court congestion. The computer has also eliminated the need
for docket books, because the computer prints case labels automatically when a case is filed, prepares the index calendar and register
of activites, and stores the information. With the use of the computer the state court administrator's office has also developed
"personnel action forms" to monitor matters such as hirings, salary
raises, and reclassifications. The computer also handles the payroll,

Implementing Court Unification

1978-79

the inventory control system, and the budget reporting and projection system.
Use of the computer system has saved money. It frees staff time
for other responsibilities. Although no employees have been fired,
with employee attrition, the administrator's office has eliminated 63
positions over the past several years. In 1973-1974 each employee in
the largest districts could process 750 cases; in 1976-1977 this number increased to 1,200. Former State Court Administrator Harry 0.
Lawson estimates that the computer, along with the structural and
administrative reforms, helped the state save money. From 1965 to
1975 the judiciary processed 78 percent more district court filings
with only 37 percent more personnel. Over the past five years one
observer estimates the savings have exceeded $1.5 million in personnel costs and elimination of service bureau charges.
b.

Use of Data: Assignment and Transfer of
Court Personnel

Centralized administration and an information system, whether
sophisticated or relatively simple, can improve a state's ability to
transfer or reassign judges and court personnel. Charles Cameron,
Alabama's Administrative Director of Courts, agrees, saying:
The availability of this information [from the state reporting
system] will permit the effective utilization of judges under
the horizontal and vertical assignment power of the Chief Justice and the authority of the presiding circuit judges. We have
a fine group of trial judges - and they are willing to travel, in
most cases. The Administrative Office of Courts must provide
information which will permit the effective utilization of this
3
resource across the State.
Several courts have had trouble implementing their authority to
transfer personnel. Although the Idaho computer monitors caseloads and the constitution permits judges to be temporarily reassigned among districts, the district administrative judge still must
receive an order from the supreme court before a judge can be transferred. Either because the process is too cumbersome or because
63. Administration of the Unified Judicial System, address by Charles Y. Cameron, Alabama State Bar, Birmingham, Alabama (July 14, 1977) reprinted in 38 ALA. LAW. 296, 299
(1977).
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judges resist transfer to other districts, the transfer authority is
rarely exercised. Magistrates, on the other hand, are transferred
frequently, causing a different set of problems. In Ada County, for
example, lawyer magistrates resent being rotated more than nonlawyer magistrates. 4
2.

Coordination of Administrative Responsibility

Other problems implementers face are establishing lines of authority between new and old administrative positions and minimizing conflicts which arise as responsibilities change.
a.

Coordination Between State Level Administrators and Trial Court Administrators

Administrators must find an acceptable balance of power between the state level, where administrative policies are often developed, and the local level, where they are executed. In Idaho, when
the position of administrative director of the courts was created,
local administrators relinquished some of their autonomy. Many of
them resented losing authority. One close observer explained, "The
statewide interests of the administrative office clash with local concerns. The trial court administrators get along better with each
other than they do with the state administrative office."
Although the administrative office of the courts has authority for
statewide administration, it has not used its power extensively in
order to preclude friction between the state and local levels. One
individual explained the situation as follows: "Because of local resentment the state court administrator moves slowly. He tries not
to antagonize the local judiciary and performs mostly a service function." The Idaho office establishes standards but does not generally
control daily operations. It collects statistics and recommends but
64. The Kansas Supreme Court has not transferred many judges, because the judges do
not want to be transferred. Connecticut, already having powers of transfer, fears that forum
shopping and other problems caused by transfer will be increased by court unification. Colorado, on the other hand, has effectively transferred court personnel. The Colorado judiciary
was able to handle a number of simultaneous trials where numerous youths were arrested
after disturbances at a July 4th religious festival. Five judges, twenty court employees and
even a xerox machine were transferred to the district for the trials. The local school.superintendent opened the schoolhouse as a courthouse. Because the judiciary responded promptly
and efficiently, the potential crisis (from the need to hold many trials in a short time) never
developed.
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does not order or command. In short, a decentralized system helps
to avoid tension.
Most implementers in the states visited agree that decentralization is one way to coordinate local and state administration. In
Kentucky, Chief Justice Scott Reed, who is the chief administrative
officer in the state, has decentralized administrative responsibilities. He is reluctant to create abrasive situations, even if decentralization risks sacrificing efficiency in some areas. As he has emphasized, "I'm a believer in broad guidelines with as much flexibility
as possible under the constitution and statutes."
Colorado has long espoused a similar philosophy. As Harry 0.
Lawson stressed in a 1970 speech:
The way in which the administration of a unified system is
organized also is a major factor in gaining support and cooperation. We, in Colorado, have taken the position that administration should be decentralized as much as possible, consistent
with good management and in accordance with general guidelines and procedures. Certainly, some centralization is necessary, but a highly centralized structure reduces the ability and
desire to participate in the decision-making process at the trial
court level and, consequently, the amount of cooperation that
can be expected. 5
Colorado is a prototype. The state court administrator treats each
of the state's 22 judicial districts as a separate administrative unit
under the control of a chief judge. Within their districts, chief
judges, who are appointed by the chief justice, are delegated very
substantial administrative responsibility. They in turn are authorized to appoint district administrators to aid with daily tasks. Decentralization, Lawson acknowledges, has made the system more
palatable, although it imposes extra burdens on the state court
administrator's office to work with and train local personnel.
b.

Coordination Between Local Judges and Trial
Court Administrators

Unification often highlights petty jealousies between trial judges
and court administrators. Kentucky judges preferred to be indepen65.

Administering a Unified Court System, supra note 48.

66.

Id.
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dent and resented any authority administrators gained. Florida
judges hired their friends as administrators, treated the administrators as members of their personal staff, and resisted modern managerial techniques. 7
In Kansas some judges initially believed they would lose authority
to the administrators. Once they realized this was not the case, they
came to appreciate the assistance administrators offered. A close
observer of the transition in Wyandotte County commented,
"Judges in the past spent 30-50 percent of their time in administrative work. Now that administrative duties have been assumed by
the state judicial administrator and the trial court administrator,
the burden on the judges has been relieved."
Indeed, one way to coordinate administrative functions between
judges and trial court administrators is to allow time for judges to
enjoy relief from administrative duties.
In Idaho, where magistrates are administrators, the Kansas problem did not arise. Although wearing two hats reduces antagonism,
it increases work loads. One concerned participant remarked,
"Magistrates cannot effectively do both jobs." Yet, that individual
continued, magistrates may be more effective administrators because they are also judges. In one Idaho county the magistrate's
assistant relieves him of many administrative duties. This allows
him to supervise administration but to devote most of his time to
judicial duties.
Idaho has also avoided a potential conflict between the administrative district judge and the magistrate administrator. As an observer in one county reported:
Initially the trial court administrator was a job without a description. The position had to develop as time passed. Conflicts
could have arisen if administrative district judges had not relinquished some authority. However, conflicts did not arise
because there was a general willingness in the district to give
the new position some meat. Conflicts would have arisen if
everyone had wanted to maintain the status quo.
67. Berkson & Hays, Injecting Court Administrators into an Old System: A Case of
Conflict in Florida, 2 JusT. Sys. J. 57, 68-70 (1976).
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Coordination Between Court Clerks and
Trial Court Administrators
Court clerks, traditionally local elected officials, exercise much
authority over county judicial business." When court administration is centralized, they may lose authority to trial court administrators. Tempering the opposition of court clerks to trial court administrators remains a major problem in Kentucky. Clerks not only fear
they will lose their jobs, but, ironically, they also fear the administrators will burden them with increased reporting and record keeping requirements.
Professors Larry Berkson and Steven Hays studied the jobs of
court clerks in Florida, sending questionnaires to each of the 67
clerks. They found that almost half (49.1 percent) of the 55 court
clerks that responded did not believe the administrators perform a
useful role. The administrators were frequently described by clerks
as "useless," "worthless," or "incompetent." 6 Like those in Kentucky, the Florida clerks not only worry about losing administrative
responsibility, they also fear the administrative and technological
innovations.7 0 This attitude hinders Florida's trial court administrators. Because they have had to cope with local antagonism, condescension or mere indifference, the administrators have been unsuccessful in "consolidating their positions" or in "instituting uniform,
modem administrative procedures."'" Over time, this antagonism
may diminish. States may also relieve this antagonism by providing
for appointment rather than election of court clerks. First, the judiciary can appoint people who will work well with local administrators. Second, a clerk who is appointed by the judiciary is subject to
the administrative authority of the courts. The appointed clerk thus
lacks the ability of the elected clerk to create a personal fiefdom.
c.

3. Personnel ClassificationSystem
Implementers also encounter problems establishing a personnel
classification system for the courts.
68. Berkson & Hays, The ForgottenPoliticians:Court Clerks, 30 UNIv. MiAMI L. REv. 499,
506-09 (1976).
69. Berkson & Hays, supra note 67, at 70.
70. Berkson & Hays report that the court clerks fear trial court administrators will introduce new managerial techniques which undermine the clerks' independence. Id. at 71.
71. Id. at 72-73.
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a. Benfits
Neither judges nor auxiliary personnel favor a statewide personnel system which deprives them of benefits that were gained prior
to unification. During campaigns, proponents usually promise that
unification will not impair accrued benefits. Later, problems arise,
usually because implementing legislation must integrate many disparate local benefits. In Kentucky, for example, only judges from
the supreme court, the court of appeals and the circuit courts were
included within the judicial department retirement plan. The 113
district court judges became part of a state retirement program
which provides less comprehensive benefits for participants.
In New York administrators faced two difficulties with their personnel plan: (1) preserving and integrating vacation, disability, retirement and pension rights for the new state employees; and (2)
bargaining with approximately 130 unions representing over 10,000
employees. Although New York administrators hope to consolidate
unions as quickly as possible, this problem may rankle them for a
long time. In fact, upgrading benefits to reduce disparities among
employees on the same level appears to offer the only feasible solution to the problem of standardizing a personnel system without
depriving any employees of accrued benefits.
b.

Salaries

Implementers also must establish fair salaries. In Idaho, where
administrators are still planning a statewide personnel system for
the judiciary, salary inequities remain a problem even at the county
level. The state does not set magistrates' salaries. Rather, even
though the state pays the salaries, magistrate commissions determine salaries for magistrates. Initially, salaries among magistrates
in Ada County differed widely. This problem has only been remedied in part: the salaries of lawyer magistrates are comparable,
varying only between $1,000 and $2,000, but large variations remain
among the salaries of lay magistrates. A comparison of salaries
among districts indicates large discrepancies, particularly between
the salaries of lay and lawyer magistrates. One observer believed the
statewide difference between them was as high as $4,000 to $5,000.
During the campaign in Alabama and New York, proponents of
court unification assured auxiliary employees that their salaries
would not be reduced. To keep this promise, they raised salaries so
that all persons in the same job classification received the same pay.
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The policy gave some employees unexpected raises, but it avoided
conflict over differences.
c.

Titles and Functions

Implementers, who are responsible for establishing a personnel
system, also must amalgamate titles and functions of numerous
court employees. Reclassifying employees created problems in both
New York, which merged 10,000 employees, and South Dakota,
which merged 5,000. "Job classifications, descriptions and duties
performed by employees were very inconsistent," explained a South
Dakota finance officer. To ,solve the problems, South Dakota engaged the Public Administration Service (PAS), a private, nonprofit consulting firm from Chicago. With the aid of a computer,
PAS helped South Dakota administrators reclassify all employees
and bring them within a single system. South Dakota implemented
its new plan gradually. During the first phase in January, 1975,
circuit judges, court reporters, magistrates (both lay and lawyer),
and clerks were incorporated into the system. Subsequently, in July
of that same year, the system added deputy clerks, bailiffs, and
court service workers, and their operating expenses. Conversely, in
New York all employees technically became state employees on
April 1, 1977. Nevertheless, administrators did not expect to reclassify them until fall or later.
When Colorado implemented a statewide personnel plan for judicial employees in the late 1960's, it used a different approach to the
problem. The administrator's office used in-house staff to conduct
a desk audit (or task analysis) of all employees who would be
merged.72 About 1,300 employees were involved in the transition,
which had some problems but went more smoothly than had been
contemplated. The plan went into effect January 1, 1970.
4.

Timing

Where state financing and a personnel classification plan are implemented at the same time, implementers also face a problem of
coordinating pay periods and paychecks, including withholding,
deductions and salaries. Although this is partially a problem of state
financing, it is more closely related to administration, because it is
72.

This information was also used to merge salaries and benefits.
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usually a result of a state personnel system for the judiciary.
In Alabama, judges, clerks, supernumerary clerks, reporters and
other court employees all had different pay periods. The implementing legislation provided for the state to pay the salaries of a few
groups at a time so that the state treasurer did not have to coordinate the disparate pay periods of all judicial employees at once.
The problem in New York was similar, but the solution was different. As one New Yorker explained, "No one anticipated the problems of preparing correct paychecks for 10,000 new employees, with
proper deductions and union dues. The state comptroller requires
proof of all withholding, so documentation had to be established for
all new employees." New York administrators devised an ingenious
solution. In March, 1977, shortly before the statewide judicial personnel system took effect, dummy paychecks were prepared and
sent to all new state employees to see if the proper deductions had
been made.
When the state adds local court employees to a statewide personnel system, the discrepancy between county and state fiscal years
may create a problem. For example, New York counties are on a
calendar year fiscal year, whereas the state's fiscal year begins
April 1. Consequently, counties had to budget additional funds to
provide for judicial costs during the three month interval between
the close of the county fiscal year and the commencement of the
state fiscal year.73
In contrast to New York, Colorado purposely implemented the
personnel system using the fiscal year discrepancy to its best advantage. The end of the Colorado counties' fiscal year is December 31,
while the state's fiscal year ends June 30. Implementing legislation
to finance the personnel system was presented and approved in the
1969 legislature. It was scheduled to become effective January 1,
1970, which corresponded with the beginning of the county fiscal
year. This arrangement allowed counties to prepare their budgets
knowing they would be relieved of personnel costs for the next fiscal
year and, at the same time, reduced the burden on the state because
the initial appropriation only had to finance six months of personnel
costs.
73. The impact of this discrepancy must not be overstated. Although New York has
adopted "first instance financing," the state's share of the judicial budget during the first
implementation year is only 12.5 percent. Therefore, counties must still provide the larger
share of judicial costs during the first year, regardless of fiscal year periods.
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Centralized Rule-Making
1. DeterminingAreas for Rule-Making

Unlike the other elements of unification, a mandate granting the
supreme court authority to promulgate rules does not create a discrepancy between the authorized and the existing systems. The
rule-making authority is effective immediately, regardless of
whether or not the supreme court exercises it. Therefore, a relatively
unique problem of rule-making is to define the general areas where
the rule-making power should be exercised and to determine which
rules should be promulgated.
A supreme court should make informed decisions about these
issues. If it does not, it may encounter difficulties similar to those
experienced by the South Dakota Supreme Court when it drew
court boundaries establishing the number of judges and location of
circuits before it conducted any field research or asked lawyers for
their advice. As a result, circuit boundaries were ineptly drawn, and
case loads were unevenly distributed. One circuit had a total of ten
contested cases a year; another had eighteen. Eventually, the court
combined the two circuits and removed a judge. But this resolution
caused great dissatisfaction. "It was like pulling teeth at this stage.
The Court should have been more careful to begin with," reported
a South Dakota justice.
In contrast to South Dakota, Ohio moved cautiously. The 1968
Modern Courts Amendment authorized the supreme court to promulgate rules of superintendence for all courts of the state, but the
court scarcely exercised its power until C. William O'Neill became
Chief Justice. O'Neill wanted the court to promulgate rules to reduce court delay, but he was not sure what rules were needed. He
selected approximately twelve of the most capable trial judges in
the state and invited them individually to a private, off-the-record
session before the Ohio Supreme Court where they would candidly
discuss the reasons for court delay. "We used no consultants,"
O'Neill has said. "In my view that is a colossal waste of money."7 4
After identifying several causes of delay, O'Neill asked the judges
to recommend rules by which the supreme court could eliminate
those causes. He refused to consider suggestions that would increase
74. Judicial Planning, Budgeting and Management, address by Chief Justice C. William
O'Neill, National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, Seattle,
Washington (July 19, 1976).
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the number of judges until he had tried other methods to reduce
delay." O'Neill also convened a separate session with judges from
the eight most populous counties. Assisted by knowledgeable trial
judges, the supreme court identified ten causes of delay in the Ohio
courts and adopted 15 rules of superintendence to eliminate them.
O'Neill's meetings gave the Ohio Supreme Court valuable information on problems in the trial courts and enabled it to draft rules
to solve them. The results, as O'Neill has reported, were
"phenomenal." In four years case filings have increased 25 percent,
but during that time only one trial judge has been added.7"
2. Rules as Administrative Tools: A Case Study in
Delay
Our analysis of methods to implement rule-making authority
would not be complete without an in-depth examination of the Ohio
superintendence rules. Their success makes them prototypes which
other courts may wish to use to begin implementing the rule-making
authority.
The first cause of delay identified by the judges was a lack of
administrative authority in multi-judge courts. To correct this problem the court used its rule-making authority to create an administrative judgeship. The administrative judge is responsible to the
chief justice and submits a report to him every 30 days.
The lack of a plan for assigning cases fairly also caused delay.
Chief Justice O'Neill noted this problem had two distinct disadvantages:
This led to lawyers shopping for favorable judges and to judges
shopping for easy cases from the assignment commissioner.
The judges shopped for criminal cases that could be disposed
of by a guilty plea or civil cases that were sure to be settled. In
both instances the judge could terminate the case quickly and
take the rest of the day off at the track or country club.77
To resolve this problem the court promulgated a rule to assign cases
by lot. The rule also provided that the judge to whom a case is
assigned must remain responsible for the case until the file is closed.
Because accurate case reports were rarely made, a third rule was
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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promulgated to make each judge responsible for submitting to the
chief justice a monthly report of his work. This rule also made the
administrative judge responsible for the accuracy of these reports.
Lawyers often caused delay by failing to file journal entries after
a case was decided. Many Ohio judges believed the reason for this
reprehensible practice was that it gave lawyers leverage to collect
their fees, especially in domestic relations cases. The court rule
promulgated in response requires the judge to make the journal
entry if the attorney fails to do so within 30 days of the order.
The court also addressed the failure of trial judges to review cases
periodically and to dismiss those which have not been prosecuted
with diligence by counsel. Its rule requires judges to review all cases
which have been on the docket over six months. If no action has
been taken on a case within six months, the judge must give notice
to counsel, who must in turn show good cause why he has not moved
the case or suffer dismissal for want of prosecution.
Criminal trials caused delay for three reasons. First, grand jury
actions were usually delayed after a bind over."' The rule promulgated to address the problem says if there is no grand jury action
within 60 days of the bind over, the matter is dismissed, unless good
cause is shown and the court grants the prosecuting attorney a
continuance for a specified time. Second, defense lawyers often delayed bringing criminal matters to trial until they collected their fee
from the defendant. The supreme court promulgated a rule requiring all criminal cases to be tried within six months of the date of
arraignment on indictment or information. Failure to try the case
must be reported to the chief justice who may take all steps necessary to insure a prompt trial. The legislature supplemented this rule
by a statute effective January 1, 1974, which states that jailed felons
must be tried within 90 days of their arrest or the matter will be
dismissed. Third, courts often delay sentencing a convicted defendant even after the judge has received the completed probation
report. Again this delay is often the fault of the defense attorney who
may be using unethical leverage to collect a fee. The court responded with a rule requiring a sentencing hearing within fifteen
days of the receipt of the probation report.
78. A bind over occurs after a magistrate has determined at an initial appearance that
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and that the defendant has
committed the crime. The defendant is either jailed or released on bail or recognizance until
the grand jury convenes and determines whether or not to indict.
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Lawyers caused problems when they had to be in different courts
on different matters at the same time. For this problem the court
promulgated a rule stipulating that once an attorney agrees with
opposing counsel and with a judge upon a date certain for trial, the
court may require him either to try the case himself or to substitute
an attorney who will. If the attorney refuses to do either of these,
the rule permits the judge to remove him from the case.
3.

Execution and Compliance
a. Sources and Types of Opposition

As the range and diversity of Ohio rules indicate, many problems
can be solved by court rule. Similar to the other elements of unification, implementers may have trouble carrying out their plans and
getting people to obey. The legislature in some states may veto court
made rules, if it believes they interfere with its right to adopt substantive laws. Sometimes the legislature may respond to political
pressure from groups adversely affected by the rules by vetoing
them. In Florida, the court has implemented its rule-making power
very cautiously to avoid a confrontation with the legislature.
In Ohio, where rules are effective unless disapproved by a concurrent resolution of the legislature, the court's first attempt to promulgate rules of criminal procedure did not pass legislative scrutiny.
Several Ohio political observers believe the rules were rejected because of intense political lobbying by municipal clerks and bail
bondsmen. The bail bondsmen were particularly opposed because
the rules would have put them out of office.
Other Ohio rules have been challenged. Both Rule 14, which restricted the granting of continuances, and Rule 15, which allowed
videotaped evidence of trials (by means of extending Ohio Civil
Procedure Rule 40) and electronic transcription of proceedings, were
attacked. A challenge to Rule 4(B) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided for criminal appeals by the prosecution, resulted in the supreme court holding its own rule invalid."
A related problem arose implementing the superintendence rules
for the municipal court. These rules require judges to complete a
number of forms about case loads. The judges did not like to fill out
79. State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975). The rule was held invalid
because it enlarged a substantive provision of statutory law and, thus, exceeded the procedural bounds of the court's rule-making authority.
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the forms since many situations which they had to report did not
fit easily into any single category required by the form. At first, the
data were inaccurate and could not be compared from court to
court. Despite their reluctance, judges submitted the data and, after
approximately one year of transition, the system began to function
smoothly.
b.

Methods of Encouraging Support

The challenges to the rules, the initial resistance, and the transition problems all suggest that to implement rule-making, a supreme
court should make an extra effort to aid execution and encourage
compliance.
For example, the Ohio Supreme Court published the superintendence rules July 4, 1971, and allowed judges two months to comment
upon them. In September the court met with judges to interpret the
rules, discuss objections and revise them where necessary. Prior to
the effective date of January 1, 1972, judges were required to inventory all cases and to file a report of the inventory with the chief
justice. Chief Justice O'Neill has commented that the media's
knowledge and support of his efforts were crucial to the success of
implementation. To aid continuing implementation, the chief justice toured the state every summer to meet with judges and discuss
the operation of the rules. His rapport minimized opposition which
might otherwise have arisen from the extra work the rules required
of the judges.
Chief Justice O'Neill devised several other techniques to encourage compliance in Ohio. He isolated 75 of the oldest cases and
assigned them to a judge in a videotape scene to encourage both
attorneys and judges to be prepared for trial. He reviewed the
monthly reports that the judges submitted to him and wrote a personal letter to judges who were not moving their cases fast enough.
Finally, believing that "recognition is a far stronger motivation than
money," he devised an ingenious system of awards which he gave
to judges with current calendars. The awards provided good publicity for the judges, who used them in advertisements for their reelection campaigns.
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Centralized Budgeting
1.

CoordinatingBudgets from all State Counties

Frequently, before unification, line items in a budget vary from
one county to the next. In South Dakota, each county, and often
each municipality, classified expenses differently. To coordinate the
budget the Public Administration Service consultants in South
Dakota also helped prepare a single budget with standard classifications.
Kentucky administrators not only had trouble gathering uniform
information; they sometimes could obtain no data at all. In order
to collect necessary information from which they could prepare a
budget, they analyzed data from counties where it could be obtained and projected estimates to other counties. It may be inaccurate, admitted one Kentuckian, "but we can't justify budget requests
to the legislature with no records or data." Kentucky administrators
have developed a very successful accounting system to solve this
problem. As one administrator proudly claimed, "The clerks
screamed and squealed, but it's as tight as a drum. The state auditors say it's the easiest system to audit in the state."
2.

Complexity of Budget Preparation

Even where states have achieved uniform classifications, the
sheer complexity of preparing a unitary budget remains an obstacle.
Colorado uses two methods to facilitate preparation: decentralization and automation.80 Each year the administrator's office gives the
chief judge of each district a computer print-out comparing the
budget request and actual amount spent the preceding year. The
chief judge, trial court administrator and other staff review the
print-out and determine changes in allocations. They in turn must
justify these changes to the state court administrator. The administrator and his staff hold budget hearings in each judicial district to
see first hand the problems and related budget needs. The administrator's office collects the budgets from all districts, feeds the data
to the computer and prepares the entire state judicial budget. Infor80. Colorado's Chief Justice Edward E.
budget. The discussion was derived from one
Court System, address by Edward E. Pringle,
ton (August 10, 1972) reprinted in MANAGING
bon, eds. 1977).

Pringle has spoken extensively on Colorado's
of his speeches. See Fiscal Problems of a State
Conference of Chief Justices, Seattle, WashingTHE STATE CouRTs 251 (Berkson, Hays & Car-
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mation on expenditures is entered into the computer throughout the
year, and each ensuing year the process begins anew.
Before this system could operate smoothly, a number of difficulties required attention. Colorado administrators had to teach local
judges from all the courts in the districts to develop budgets. They
devised a detailed manual with standard headings and clear instructions and distributed it to all local budget officers. They also
devised a two-step submission. Local judges submit their budget
requests to the district chief judge. He standardizes and consolidates the requests into a single district budget, which, in turn, is
submitted to the state court administrator.
Second, the administrator's office had to teach local administrators and judges to spend within their budgets. This has been resolved, in part, by a personnel rule, adopted by the supreme court,
which mandates that district administrators who overspend their
budgets can be removed." Finally the administrator's office had to
explain the complex judicial budget to the general assembly, especially to the joint budget committee, and to convince them to accept
the judiciary's recommendations.
F.

State Financing

Although centralized budgets cause some problems, implementing centralized budgeting is a major problem which arises when
states implement financing. In order for a state to understand fully
its funding responsibilities, it first must develop a means for analyzing budgets. A centralized budget helps administrators interpret
disparate financial data and thus helps implement state financing.
But other difficulties are also associated with implementing state
financing.
1.

Reluctance of the Legislature to Spend Money

A constitutional provision, statute or rule mandating state financing means nothing if the legislature is unwilling to appropriate
funds. The classic example of this problem occurred recently in
Alabama, where the legislature added to the financing legislation a
provision prohibiting the judiciary from-spending more money than
it made. In May, 1977, during the last stage of a three-year imple81.

COLORADO JUDICIAL SYSTEM PERSONNEL RULES,

R.26(a)(3).
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mentation period, it became evident that revenues generated by the
courts would fall short of the projected $16 million.82 The judiciary
faced a crisis. On May 30, Chief Justice C.C. Torbert, Jr. halted all
jury trials and permitted only essential criminal matters to proceed.
Judges continued to work, although for ten days the state had no
funds to pay their salaries. Finally, on June 10, the legislature appropriated funds which enabled courts to spend their entire anticipated budget. 3
In part, the Alabama financial problem was caused by poor estimates of income. Certainly the Alabama legislature expected that
state financing would increase costs. In fact, to offset the increase
in costs, the implementing legislation passed in 1975 not only raised
costs, fines and fees, but explicitly provided for the transfer of many
court-generated revenues to the state treasury. 4 But, the new cost,
fine and fee schedule applies only to cases filed after January 16,
1977. Cases filed before then are governed by the former cost, fine
and fee schedule, and the revenues from those matters are placed
in the county and not the state treasury.
Chief Justice Torbert does not see the matter as a temporary cash
flow problem. First, in April, 1977, the state assumed the cost of all
court supplies in Alabama's 67 counties. Second, in October, 1977,
800 judicial department staff and clerical employees were assimilated into the state personnel system, many with upgraded salaries
and benefits. Finally, the projected budget for fiscal year 1977-1978
was pared to an absolute minimum. As Colorado's Chief Justice
Edward E. Pringle has said in another setting, certain judicial costs
are almost impossible to determine in advance:
There are several judicial system activities for which it is difficult to predict the amount of money needed, even with the best
data and staff analysis. I'm referring to such things as jury
trials, grand juries, witness fees, insanity examinations and the
like. Unusual and unanticipated expenditures in these categories constitute valid grounds for a supplemental or deficiency
appropriation. Obviously, a person cannot be denied a jury
trial for lack of funds. Likewise, legitimate grand jury activities
cannot be curtailed. The court system should not be required
82. State of the Judiciary Address, address by C.C. Torbert, Jr., Alabama State Bar,
Birmingham, Alabama (July 15, 1977).
83. Alabama Cuts Jury Trials as Funds Run Out, 61 JUDICATURE 92 (1977).
84. 1975 Ala. Acts, Art. 16.
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to reduce other necessary, funded areas of operation to meet
unanticipated jury costs. That would result in robbing Peter to
pay Paul. This is another reason a supplemental appropriation
is justified. Failing that, I think this is one area of expenditures
where inherent powers may have legitimate application.8
The solution to the Alabama problem is not an easy one. Chief
Justice Torbert is conducting another study of court costs. He is also
refusing to provide legal forms to the practicing bar. He plans to
consolidate 10,000 different types of court forms currently in use in
Alabama's courts, and to employ the court's assignment and transfer powers extensively to reduce the need to hire new judges as
filings increase.86
But these are short term solutions. In a recent address to the
Alabama State Bar, Chief Justice Torbert stressed the long term
impropriety of requiring the judicial branch to be self-supporting.
As he stated:
I do not believe that the state can ever expect to see sufficient
revenues produced for the courts to adequately fund a system
of justice in Alabama. Such an idea is fundamentally unsound
and must be set aside irrespective of the consequences. No
other agency that renders public service to this state is budgeted on such terms and the idea of a judicial system imposing
fines stiff enough to pay its salaries is repugnant to any system
8
of justice.
2.

County Resistance

Another problem of implementing state financing occurs when
counties refuse to cooperate. This problem generally occurs in states
where the counties remain responsible for providing local facilities,
equipment or supplies, but where locally collected fees are channelled into the state treasury.
For example, in Colorado, although the state has appropriated
locally generated court revenues, the counties have retained title to
local courthouses and remain responsible for funding their maintenance and upkeep. One county rebelled and refused to provide an
85.
86.
87.

Fiscal Problems of a State Court System, supra note 80.
State of the Judiciary Address, supra note 82.

Id.
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adequate courtroom or chambers for a newly appointed judge. As a
result, in 1974 the state court administrator filed suit against the
county to compel it to provide space for the new judge. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that pursuant to section 13-3-108(1) of
the Colorado Revised Statutes, the county remained obligated to
provide and maintain suitable courtroom and office space for the
8
judiciary.1
Similarly in South Dakota, the state collects a share of locally
generated fees, but the counties still must provide facilities. In Parker, an extremely small South Dakota town, the county refused to
renovate an antiquated courthouse with inadequate facilities. When
a high ranking official visited the town, he mentioned that if the
structure was not adequately maintained, the city might lose its
court. The response was almost immediate; the courthouse was renovated within a few weeks.
The Kentucky administrative office devised an ingenious compromise to solve this difficult problem. It believes that the local communities should take pride in owning their own courts and that the
state should not own local facilities. By statute the state is obligated
to pay the counties four percent of the cost of constructing or renovating facilities. The state decided on the figure of four percent by
taking the two percent figure, which the federal government uses to
reimburse localities for post offices, and adding an additional two
percent. Administrators believe that this scheme requires the state
to contribute its share of the burden of providing judicial facilities,
while enabling localities to retain an equity in the buildings.
V.

CONCLUSION

In their study of implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky stress
that policies will succeed only if implementation succeeds:
The later steps of implementation were felt to be "technical
questions" that would resolve themselves if the initial agreements were negotiated and commitments were made. But the
years have shown how those seemingly routine questions of
implementation were the rocks on which the program eventu89
ally foundered.
88.

89.

Lawson v. Pueblo County, 37 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Preface to PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2, at xvii.
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The interviews conducted for this study confirm that implementation can indeed resemble a maze, with an exit hidden at the end
of sinuous paths. This article also illustrates, however, that different
problems arise in different states and sometimes even in different
localities within the same state. In fact, no state visited experienced
all the problems catalogued in this article. For example, Alabama,
South Dakota, and Colorado had little difficulty moving or storing
records; Connecticut had few problems in changing the titles of
courts; and Idaho had little trouble coordinating trial court administrators and trial judges or equalizing judicial workloads.
Certainly this latter point should comfort implementers. This article also suggests that the mere fact that difficulties arise should
not distress them unnecessarily. Problems which seemed insurmountable in some states were easily disposed of in others. Furthermore, over a period of time every state visited was capable of resolving most of the difficulties it confronted.
In fact, this article suggests that with a great deal of patience,
willingness to experiment, and practical ingenuity, implementers
can plot a map to the exit of the labyrinth. This article thus begins
the much-needed map; it remains the task of others to chart a more
complete course.

